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Abstract 
In May 2003, the United States, Canada and Argentina launched a World Trade Organization (WTO) 
case against the European Union concerning its authorization regime for genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs). The complainants challenged three types of measures: (i) an alleged general 
moratorium on the approval of GMOs; (ii) delays in the processing of product specific applications; 
(iii) national safeguard measures adopted by certain Member States banning the marketing of certain 
genetically modified products. In November 2006, the WTO condemned the European regime. Using 
the most recent advances in gravity equation, we estimate the reduction in exports of potentially 
affected products from the complainants to the European Union. Export losses are calculated by 
product, complainant country and measure at stake. Our results tend to confirm the foundations of the 
dispute: the European moratorium and product-specific measures have a negative effect on trade, as do 
safeguard measures adopted by Germany, Italy and Greece.  
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1. Introduction 
From the beginning of the 90s, the European Union (EU) implemented legislation on genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), which was however challenged by major GMO producer and exporting 
countries: In May 2003, the United States (US), Canada and Argentina launched a case at the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) against the EU. For the three complainants, the EU policy on GMOs 
reduced their exports to the EU market. In September 2006, the WTO panel stated in its report that the 
EU had applied a general de facto moratorium on the approval of GMOs since June 1999 and undue 
delays in the processing of product-specific applications, and consequently had breached its 
obligations under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement. The report also concluded that the 
national safeguard measures put in place by certain EU Members on biotech products that had already 
been approved as safe by the EU were inconsistent.  
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the trade impact of EU measures on GMOs in the 
perspective of the WTO complaint.
1
 Quite surprisingly, no research has been carried out to date to 
measure and quantify the potential export losses faced by the three complainants – Argentina, Canada 
and the US – in the EU market in monetary terms. Accordingly, our main aim is to provide an 
estimation of the revenue lost from the EU market by complainants. According to WTO dispute 
settlement practices, this revenue loss is indeed key to defining the magnitude of the retaliatory 
measures that might be enforced were the Panel‟s recommendations not implemented by the EU.2 It 
                                                 
1
 Trade of GMOs is subject to WTO rules. However, it is also regulated by the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
(which has not been ratified by the US, Argentina and Canada). To date, efforts to harmonize national 
legislations have partly failed. International harmonization bodies have achieved some success in handling safety 
approvals; however, there is still strong disagreement on several specific rules, such as labelling regulation, 
consumer information and international agreements (Gruère 2006). 
2
 In WTO legal terms, this principle is described as follows: “In considering what concessions or other 
obligations to suspend, the complaining party shall take into account (…)  the trade in the sector or under the 
agreement under which the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment, 
and the importance of such trade to that party. (…) The level of the suspension of concessions or other 
obligations authorized by the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification 
 3 
could be argued that European measures against GM products were put in place following consumers‟ 
rejection of GMOs. However, one has to remind that WTO rules do not state that the preferences of 
consumers justify regulatory measures affecting trade. These rules only state that any trade-impeding 
decision must be based on scientific evidence. Hence, applying bans without providing such evidence 
might well not only affect trade but also consumers‟ preferences. Ultimately, what matters from the 
point of view of the panel is the impact of the unjustified (according to WTO) regulations on exports 
of complainants. The decision of the WTO has been criticised on two major grounds: applicability of 
the SPS Agreement to the EU regulations on GM products (Conrad 2007); interpretation of the 
acknowledged scientific evidence provided by the EU (Perez 2007);  
European measures may have impacted other countries as well. Similarly, complainants may have 
been affected by other measures than the ones imposed by the EU. We will check, as an extension, 
whether it is the case or not. Our paper therefore provides two contributions to the literature: First, we 
focus on the main GM products being grown commercially in the complaining countries and 
potentially affected by EU measures, and provide an estimation of losses in terms of exports to the EU 
market by product, complaining country and measure at stake. To perform the estimation and get 
unbiased results, we make use of the most recent advances in gravity equation estimation. In 
particular, we try to avoid the most usual misspecifications found in the literature relying on the 
traditional simplest gravity framework that have been clearly described by Baldwin and Taglioni 
(2006). The main issue here is the necessary control for unobserved relative prices when it comes to 
explaining bilateral trade. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) refer to this as the “the gold medal of classic 
gravity model mistakes”, namely the fact that the bilateral trade costs used as regressors in the 
estimated equation are correlated with the omitted variable since trade costs enter into these 
unobserved prices.
3
 The solution generally adopted is to rely on fixed effects by country but here there 
                                                                                                                                                        
or impairment” (Source: Article 22, Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement (World Trade Organization 1994). Italics 
are ours). 
3
 The silver medal refers to the averaging of bilateral trade for each pair of countries. The bronze medal refers to 
the inappropriate deflation of nominal trade values using an aggregate price index. 
 4 
is an additional difficulty associated with the panel dimension of the data, since relative prices vary 
over time. Hence, country x year fixed effects should be used instead. We also use the Poisson 
estimator suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) rather than the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimator. The authors show that heteroskedasticity in the error terms can cause the OLS method to 
yield biased estimates. They argue that the most robust estimation method for multiplicative equations 
like gravity is Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML). This specification deals adequately with 
the zero-value observations, since the dependent variable is measured in levels. Furthermore, it 
provides estimates that are comparable to elasticity estimates from the standard linear-in-logs 
specification. The second contribution is to investigate, for comparison purposes, the impact of 
moratoria or non-approvals of GM products adopted by other countries that were not part of the WTO 
panel, such as New Zealand, Switzerland and Norway on the exporting countries complaining against 
the EU measures. In the same way, we examine the impact of EU measures on Brazilian exports, even 
though Brazil did not join the complainants. 
This research is related to the broader literature on the economic effects of the introduction of GM 
products and the costs induced by regulations on authorization and labelling aiming to segregate and 
preserve the identity of non-GM grains from GM ones. Bullock and Desquilbet (2002) investigate how 
these costs affect US seed producers, farmers and grain handlers and how they depend on standards 
defining goods as non-GM. The authors show that most of the costs faced by farmers come from the 
production process itself, while the handlers‟ main cost is the cost of dedicating equipment to either 
GMOs or non-GMOs but never both. Lapan and Moschini (2004) introduce the costs of segregation 
and identity preservation in a partial-equilibrium, two-country trade model. In their model, seeds of a 
new GM product are produced by a home-country monopolistic innovator and sold to a competitive 
farming industry. Consumers in the foreign country can choose between GM and non-GM products 
and view GM products as inferior in quality. Due to the presence of segregation and identity 
preservation costs, the introduction of GM products can lower welfare. Furthermore, regulations on 
imports of GM products, such as labelling requirements or bans, will affect income distribution among 
trading partners. Moschini et al. (2005) also allow for differentiated demand. The authors distinguish 
between GM, conventional and organic food and analyse the effects of the introduction of GM 
 5 
products. Organic and conventional products, which existed prior to the introduction of GMOs, are 
horizontally differentiated, while GM and conventional goods are vertically differentiated (GMOs are 
inferior in quality to conventional food). On the supply side, the authors account for segregation and 
identity preservation costs. Calibrated simulations show that, due to the associated segregation costs 
for non-GM products, the introduction of GMOs reduces welfare. However, this introduction benefits 
producers of organic food. Last but not least, Moschini (2008) provides a detailed review of GM 
product adoption in the agro-food sector over the fifteen years and further expected development. If 
GM crops grew very rapidly between 1994 and 2008, future development may be impeded by 
restrictive regulations adopted in particular by the EU. 
The next section provides some statistics on world production and trade of GM products. It also 
reviews EU legislation on GMOs and summarizes the dispute between the US, Canada and Argentina 
on the one hand, and the European Communities (EC) and its Member States on the other. In section 
3, we describe our data and detail our econometric specification. Section 4 reports the estimation 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
 2.1 Summary of world production and trade of GM products 
GM technology has been used to develop crops that benefit farmers, such as insect resistant and 
herbicide tolerant crops. Insect resistance means that pests can be controlled without applying 
insecticides, while herbicide tolerance means that weeds can be destroyed by applying the herbicide to 
which the plant is tolerant. In 2008, GM herbicide tolerant crops accounted for 63% of global GM 
plantings, while GM insect resistant crops accounted for 15% and stacked herbicide tolerant and insect 
resistant crops represented 22% of global GM plantings (James 2008).  
The first commercial GM crops were planted in 1994. In 2008, GM areas reached 125 million 
hectares in 25 countries. The US is the main producer country with 50% of the total areas, followed by 
Argentina (16.8%), Brazil (12.6%), Canada (6.1%), India (6.1%), China (3.0%) and Paraguay (2.2%). 
 6 
All other countries
4
 cultivate GM crops on less than 2 million hectares. Furthermore, almost 44% of 
GM crops are produced in developing countries. 
Main GM products are soybeans, maize, cotton and oilseed rape. In 2008, GM soybeans account 
for 53% of global GM crop area, followed by maize (30%), cotton (12%) and oilseed rape (5%) 
(James 2008). In terms of the share of global plantings for these four crops, GM traits account for 59% 
of soybean plantings in 2005. The shares are 13% for maize, 27% for cotton and 18% for oilseed rape 
(Brookes and Barfoot 2006).  
 
 2.2 EU Legislation on GMOs 
The EU legislation on GM products has been implemented since the beginning of the 90s and has two 
main objectives: (i) the protection of human health and the environment and (ii) the free movement of 
safe GM products in the EU. This legislation has recently been updated and a new legal framework is 
now in place.
5
 GM food and feed can be marketed only after a scientific evaluation of any risks which 
they present for human and animal health and for the environment, to be undertaken under the 
responsibility of the European Food Safety Authority. This evaluation should be followed by a risk 
management decision by the Community, under a regulatory procedure ensuring close cooperation 
between the Commission and the Member States (Regulation (EC) 1829/2003). Besides, EU Member 
States can invoke the safeguard clause and ban the sale and use on their territories of GM products that 
have obtained a market authorization from the EU. To do so, they should provide evidence that these 
products are risky for human health and the environment. Furthermore, the EU regulation also requires 
the traceability and labelling of all GM food and feed products derived from GMOs, regardless of the 
                                                 
4
 In decreasing order of hectarage: South Africa, Uruguay, Bolivia, the Philippines, Australia, Mexico, Spain, 
Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Burkina Faso, the Czech Republic, Romania, Portugal, Germany, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Egypt. 
 
5
 Details are available at http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biotechnology/gmfood/index_en.htm. Note that other 
countries also updated their legislations on GMOs (for example, the US legislation on plant-made 
pharmaceutical production was updated in 2003). 
 7 
presence or absence of GM material in the final food or feed product. Two exemptions from the 
traceability and labelling requirements do however exist. First, conventional products with 
adventitious presence of authorized GM products are not subject to these requirements if the GM 
content does not exceed the threshold of 0.9%. Second, products obtained from animals fed with GM 
feed or treated with GM medicinal products, such as meat, milk or eggs, are also exempt from the 
requirements. 
Labelling obligation for GM products is not specific to the EU. Labelling is also mandatory in 
East Europe, Brazil, China, Russia, Switzerland, Norway, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia 
and Thailand (Gruère 2006). The threshold of GM content under which labelling is not required varies 
from one country to another (5% or below).  
In July 2003, the EU Commission also adopted a recommendation on guidelines for the 
development of national strategies to ensure the co-existence of GM, traditional and organic crops 
(2003/556/EC). According to these guidelines, the approaches to co-existence need to be developed in 
a transparent and cooperative way, based on technical guidelines. Furthermore, co-existence rules 
should be cost-effective (without going beyond what is necessary to comply with EU threshold levels 
for GMO labelling) and specific to different types of crop, since the probability of admixture varies 
from one crop to another. 
 
 2.3 Summary of the trade dispute to date 
The dispute between the US, Canada and Argentina on the one hand, and the EU and its Member 
States on the other, on the approval and marketing of biotech products by the EU covers a relatively 
long time period. On May 13 and 14, 2003, the US, Canada and Argentina launched the WTO case 
against the EU by requesting consultations concerning the measures adopted by the EU. The 
consultations did not allow the dispute to be solved and in August 2003, the complainants requested 
the establishment of a dispute settlement panel set up on March 4, 2004. Over the course of the 
dispute, tons of documents were submitted by the disputing parties, as well as by the six independent 
 8 
scientific experts whose opinion was requested. The Panel report
6
 was postponed several times and 
finally delivered on September 29, 2006, and adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO on 
November 21, 2006. In a nutshell, the EU was condemned for not having respected the binding 
framework of the SPS agreement.  
The SPS agreement aims to prevent unnecessary trade barriers to agricultural products, while 
recognizing the right of countries to set their own standards. In order to avoid situations where sanitary 
or phytosanitary requirements are used as disguised protectionism, countries are invited to enforce 
measures in line with existing international standards or to provide scientific evidence regarding health 
concerns otherwise. Various articles of this agreement were held against the EU by the Panel. 
According to Articles 5.1, 5.5 and 5.6, SPS measures must be based on scientific assessment taking 
into account risk assessment techniques developed by international organizations, should avoid 
arbitrariness and should take into account economic feasibility. According to Articles 2.2 and 2.3, 
countries shall ensure that measures are applied only to the extent necessary to reach their protection 
purpose and should not be applied in a discriminatory or protectionist manner. Annex B(1) and Article 
7 insist on the transparency of the regulations adopted, including the necessity to publish promptly the 
measures. Annex C(1)(a) first clause and Article 8 condemn undue delays in the approval procedures 
of contaminants. 
The EU announced its intention to conform to the Panel‟s recommendations, but subject to a 
reasonable period of time. In June 2007, the complainant countries and the EU agreed that this period 
would be twelve months from the date of adoption of the Panel report. This deadline was postponed 
several times. The US and the EU held their seventh technical meeting on GM issues on October 22-
23, 2008, and discussions continue between the parties since. Furthermore, Argentina and the EU 
mutually agreed to extend the reasonable period of time for implementation of the Panel‟s 
recommendations so as to expire on February 28, 2010. Lastly, Canada and the EU reached a mutually 
agreed solution on July 2009. Both countries established a bilateral dialogue on agricultural biotech 
market access issues of mutual interest with bi-annually meetings. 
                                                 
6
 Panel report is available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm  
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We now summarise the detail of the conclusions of the Panel report, which will constitute the very 
basis of our empirical estimation below. Three types of measures were challenged by the 
complainants: 
- The general moratorium on the approval of GMOs implemented in June 1999 and considered 
by complainants as inconsistent with the SPS agreement. The EU failed to have new biotech 
products entering the approval procedures after June 1999; 
- Delays in the processing of product-specific applications. The EU failed to consider for final 
approval applications concerning certain specified biotech products for which it had 
commenced approval procedures; 
- Safeguard clauses adopted by certain Member States banning the marketing of certain GMO 
products. 
The first series of conclusions concerned the inconsistency of the moratorium with respect to the 
SPS agreement. The report (World Trade Organization 2006) concluded that the EU applied a general 
de facto moratorium on the approval of biotech products between June 1999 and August 2003, which 
was conflicting with rules of the SPS agreement.
7
 Importantly, the Panel concluded that Argentina 
failed to establish that the EU did not take account of Argentina‟s special needs as a developing 
country Member (Article 10.1 of the SPS Agreement concerning special and differential treatment to 
be conceded to developing economies). Given these conclusions and the fact that Argentina did not 
claim the general moratorium was inconsistent with provisions concerning delays in approval 
procedures, Argentina‟s complaint about this measure was not upheld by the Panel. 
                                                 
7
 Annex C(1)(a) first clause and Article 8 of the Agreement have been infringed by the EU. However, the 
moratorium cannot be considered an SPS measure within the meaning of Articles 2.2, 2.3, 5.1, 5.5, 5.6, 7 and 
Annex B(1) of the SPS Agreement. 
 10 
The second series of conclusions concerned product-specific applications. The Panel concluded 
that there were indeed undue delays in the completion of the approval procedures for 24 products and 
asked the EU to bring the product-specific measures into conformity with its obligations.
8
 
Finally, the Panel also condemned the safeguard measures adopted by Austria, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy and Luxembourg on certain products because they were not based on a risk assessment 
satisfying the definition of the SPS Agreement.
9
 None of the national bans were removed until 2005, 
the last year included in our empirical analysis, despite repeated requests by the European 
Commission to lift them.
10
  
 
3. Data and econometric specification 
 3.1 Data 
Our study focuses on the main GM crops grown commercially and potentially affected by EU 
authorization procedures (e.g. moratorium, product-specific applications, and safeguard measures), 
namely maize, cotton and oilseed rape. We exclude soybeans from the sample of GM products 
affected by EU procedures. RoundUp Ready is the only GM soybean product commercially grown 
and was approved for import and use in food and feed by the EU before the 1999 moratorium (United 
States Department of Agriculture 2000). Furthermore, we also include corn gluten in our estimations. 
Corn gluten is a product derived from corn and therefore subject to the same authorization procedures 
as corn.  
We cover the period from 1994 to 2005. We start two years before the significant increase in 
world production of GMOs and the adoption by the EU of the first restrictions on these products. 
                                                 
8
 The EU acted inconsistently with its obligations under Annex C(1)(a) first clause and Article 8 of the SPS 
Agreement. Other claims under the SPS Agreement were rejected by the Panel. 
9
 Articles 2.2 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement were infringed accordingly. As Belgium and Luxembourg are 
aggregated in our sample, we will not consider the Luxembourg‟s ban in our empirical application. 
 11 
Thus, by observing trade flows both before and after the replacement of non-GM crops by GM ones 
and the implementation of European procedures, we can investigate whether these procedures had an 
impact on bilateral trade flows. Our trade data come from the BACI database (Base pour l‟Analyse du 
Commerce International - World Database of International Trade) developed by the CEPII (Centre 
d‟Etudes Prospectives et d‟Informations Internationales - French Centre for International Economic 
Studies). This database uses original procedures to harmonise COMTRADE data (Commodity Trade 
Statistics Database).
11
 We work at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System of products 
classification (hereafter HS) and consider the following headings (in HS 2002): 
- HS 100510: Maize (seeds); 
- HS 100590: Maize (other); 
- HS 120510: Rape or colza seeds, whether or not broken (low erucic acid rape or canola seeds); 
- HS 120590: Rape or colza seeds, whether or not broken (other);  
- HS 120720: Cotton seeds; 
- HS 230310: Residues of starch manufacture and similar residues; 
- HS 230990: Other preparations of a kind used in animal feeding. 
The last two codes are for corn gluten. In the 1988 and 1996 versions of the HS classification on 
which the BACI database is based, both codes HS 120510 and HS 120590 are aggregated in a single 
code (HS 120500). We therefore also aggregate them in our estimations.
12
 In the world trade statistics, 
a distinction cannot yet be made within the same HS code between trade flows of GM and non-GM 
products. However, in the main GM producing countries, non-GM products have often been 
substituted to a large degree by GM ones. A fall in trade could therefore be interpreted at least partially 
as the result of the adoption of restrictions against GMOs by the importing countries. Of course, 
                                                                                                                                                        
10
 Ultimately, in November 2004, no qualified majority was reached in the Council to ask Member States to lift 
these measures. In June 2005, the Council voted against a proposal from the Commission, which required the 
removal of national safeguard measures. See http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/793 
11
 http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/baci.htm   
12
 This aggregation does not bias our study. Products belonging to both codes face exactly the same restrictions 
at the same time and by the same countries. 
 12 
changes in competitiveness or transaction costs may have played a role too, and this must be 
disentangled from the trade effects on complaining countries of the GM restrictions. Fortunately, 
econometrics allows us to deal with such issues. 
We restrict our sample to the main exporting and importing countries of maize, oilseed rape and 
cotton. Our sample of exporters includes Argentina, Canada, the US, Brazil, Australia, China, the 
Ukraine, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia-Montenegro, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Chile and South Africa. For cotton, we also consider exports from Benin, the Ivory Cost 
and Togo (the main exporters of cotton to the EU). The group of importing countries includes each EU 
Member State,
13
 Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, the Ukraine, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, China, 
Canada, the US, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand. 
 
In our empirical application, we consider three different types of GMO events: (i) the general 
moratorium, which affects US and Canada exports of GM products to the EU, (ii) the product-specific 
applications for which the Panel concluded on the existence of undue delays in the completion of the 
approval procedures and (iii) the national safeguard measures. Tables 1 and 2 report details of the 
latter two types of events. In both tables, we focus on the main GM crops grown commercially and 
included in our empirical analysis (cf. supra). Table 1 mentions the date of introduction of the 
product-specific application by the complainant country(ies), the concerned complainant country(ies) 
(as recognized by the WTO Panel) and the date of approval of the event in the complainant 
country(ies). The date of EU approval, if any, is also reported. Table 2 provides the list of safeguard 
measures condemned by the WTO Panel, the date of initiation, the concerned complainant country(ies) 
(as recognized by the WTO Panel) and the date of approval of the event in the complainant 
country(ies).  
 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 here 
                                                 
13
 Belgium and Luxembourg are aggregated. EU Members are only considered as importing countries. Intra-EU 
trade flows are therefore not included in our sample. 
 13 
 
 
  3.2 Econometric specification 
In this section, we tackle the trade impact of the measures adopted against GMOs on exports of the 
complainant countries. Our objective is accordingly to quantify the trade impact of EU measures on 
GMOs in the very perspective of the conclusions of the WTO panel. Gravity equation offers an 
appropriate framework for this analysis, provided that the frequent misuses of this methodology are 
avoided. The gravity equation can be seen as a reduced form of the theoretical trade flow prediction. 
Our theoretical foundation for trade patterns is the standard new trade monopolistic competition-CES 
demand-Iceberg costs model introduced by Krugman (1980). Producers operating under increasing 
returns in each country produce differentiated varieties that they ship, with a cost, to consumers in all 
countries. Following Redding and Venables (2004), the value of exports for a given product k
14
 from 
country i to country j in t can be written as follows: 
 
1 1 1
                                   ( ) (1)
ijt ijtit jt jtit
x n p T E G
 
 
with 
it
n  and 
it
p  the number of varieties and prices in country i in year t, 
jt
E  and 
jt
G  being the 
expenditure and price index of country j in t. The variable ijtT  represents the iceberg transport costs in 
year t. 
A theoretically consistent approach for estimating equation (1) consists in using fixed effects for 
each exporting and importing country. These fixed effects incorporate size effects, but also the price 
and number of varieties of the exporting country and the size of demand and the price index of the 
importing country. This specification overcomes the already mentioned “gold medal” mistake in 
gravity equations - the failure to consider relative prices. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) show, however, 
that in the case of panel data, time-invariant country fixed effects are not sufficient to remove all the 
related bias: the cross-section bias will be removed but not the time-series bias. To remove the latter, 
                                                 
14
 For simplicity, subscript k is omitted in equation (1). 
 14 
we interact our country fixed effects with year dummies. Furthermore, Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006) show that the parameters of log-linearized models estimated by OLS as elasticites can be 
biased in the presence of heteroskedasticity. They suggest using the PPML method to estimate 
multiplicative equations like (1). In their specification, the dependent variable is measured in levels. 
However, this specification provides estimates that are comparable to elasticity estimates from the 
standard linear-in-logs specification. Furthermore, this specification deals adequately with zero-value 
observations. Our sample includes a high number of zeros (44,291 observations over a total of 57,552, 
i.e. 77%). The performance of the PPML estimator in the presence of a large proportion of zeros has 
been recently questioned in the literature. Using Monte Carlo simulations, Martin and Pham (2008) 
suggest that the PPML estimator provides biased estimates when zero trade flows are frequent. 
However, as highlighted by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2009), the simulations performed by Martin 
and Pham (2008) are flawed in that the data are not generated by a constant elasticity model. When 
data are appropriately generated, a large proportion of zeros does not affect the performance of the 
PPML estimator. We therefore use the PPML estimator.
15
 
Transport costs are measured with the bilateral distance. These distances come from the CEPII 
database
16
 and are defined as the sum of the bilateral distances between the biggest cities of countries, 
weighted by the population living in those cities. We also include a dummy variable “Common 
border” set to 1 for pairs of countries that share a border. As well as this, we control for linguistic 
similarity by including a dummy, equal to one if both countries share an official language. Data is 
extracted from the above-mentioned CEPII database. 
 
                                                 
15
 Other methods, such as standard OLS (with ln(1+flow) as the dependent variable) and Tobit, have been 
suggested in the literature to deal with zero trade flows. To discrimate between these methods properly, one can 
perform a heteroskedasticity-robust RESET test (Ramsey 1969). In our case, the test rejects models estimated 
using the OLS and Tobit regressions. Only the estimations using the PPML method pass the test. The Reset 
statistic is reported in the results section (bottom of Table 3). 
16
 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm  
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Our focus in this paper is on the trade impact of EU measures on GMOs on the complainant 
countries. The presence of a measure potentially affecting exports of complainant countries to the EU 
is represented by dummy variables. We define two sets of dummies, each associated with different 
types of EU restrictions:  
- The first set is for the EU moratorium and specific measures. The years of implementation of 
both moratorium and product-specific measures are often very similar. Therefore, to avoid a 
collinearity problem, we group both types of measures into a common variable.  
- The second set of dummies deals with the safeguard measures adopted by certain EU 
Members.   
Our dummies have four dimensions: time, product, exporting country, and importing country. The 
time dimension is 1994-2005 and the products are the main GM crops grown commercially and 
potentially affected by EU measures (HS 100510, 100590, 120500, 120720, 230310 and 230990 cf. 
supra). Since we are studying the trade impact of EU measures condemned by the WTO Panel, 
dummies are defined for bilateral export flows from one complainant country (Argentina, Canada or 
the US) to an EU Member State. EU Members refer to the 15 EU States (with Belgium and 
Luxembourg aggregated) between 1994 and 2003 and to the 25 EU States in 2004 and 2005. We 
assume that the EU moratorium and/or specific measures can affect each bilateral relationship between 
a complainant country and an EU State.  
The dates of approval of GM events in each EU country come from the Agbios database
17
 and are 
completed with scrutiny of legislation. Our empirical application uses annual data. However, measures 
on GMOs can be put in place (or lifted) at any time of the year. Thus, the dummy variable is set to one 
in year t if the restriction is put in place before the middle of year t and set to zero if the restriction is 
put in place after. The middle of the year is June 30. Furthermore, the dummy variable is automatically 
set to one for all years following commercial plantings and as long as the measure is in place.  
                                                 
17
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Using these rules, the set of dummy variables for EU moratorium and specific measures is defined 
as follows: 
- EU moratorium and/or specific measures = 1 for products on which the EU imposes a 
moratorium and/or product-specific measures and during years of implementation, if the 
exporter is Argentina, Canada or the US and the importer is one EU Member State; 0 
otherwise. 
The set of dummies for national bans is built as follows: 
- Austria‟s safeguard measure = 1 for all products on which Austria adopted a safeguard 
measure and during the years of the measure‟s implementation, if the exporter is Argentina, 
Canada or the US and the importer is Austria; 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, we define dummies for the safeguard measures of Germany, Italy, France and Greece. 
 
Our estimated equation is as follows: 
21 3
exp fe fe ln cbord clang          (2)k k kjijt it jt ij ij ij ijt ijtit tx d 4δ GMOs  
where 
k
ijtx  is the dollar value of country j‟s imports from country i in year t, feit  are the time-
varying exporter fixed effects, fe
jt
 the time-varying importer fixed effects, 
ij
d  the bilateral distance. 
cbord
ij
 and clang
ij
 are dummies to control for common border and common language. k
tij
GMOs  is 
the vector of dummies accounting for measures on GMOs for product k. The vector  4δ  represents the 
estimated coefficients on these variables. )exp(u
k
ijt
k
ijt , with  
k
tij
u  the error term. Under the 
assumption that the expectation of  conditional on the covariates equals one, the parameters can be 
estimated consistently using the PPML estimator. We use cluster regressions to deal with the problem 
of clustering of errors. We do not control for bilateral tariffs, and this for two reasons. First, bilateral 
tariffs do not vary significantly over time. Second, while yearly data on bilateral tariffs is available in 
the TRade Analysis and INformation System (TRAINS) database, there are many missing values and 
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the data does not include all specific duties, tariff quotas and anti-dumping duties applied by importing 
countries. In our estimations, the influence of bilateral applied protection is partly captured by 
country-year fixed effects. 
 
4. Estimation results 
 4.1 Overall results 
Table 3 presents the results. Column (1) provides estimates of the average trade effect of EU 
restrictions on GMOs on the three complainant‟s exports. First, regarding gravity covariates, the 
distance affects bilateral imports negatively and significantly. Common border and common language 
variables do not have the expected positive and significant effect. One explanation could be that our 
products are homogeneous goods. Cultural linkages between trade partners are less important for such 
goods than for differentiated products (Rauch 1999). 
For all products, estimated coefficients on the “EU moratorium and/or product-specific measures” 
variable are negative and significant. These coefficients can be interpreted as a percentage change in 
the dependent variable when the dummy variable equals one. Thus, the value -2.24 for maize seeds 
means that the dependent variable is 89.4% (exp[-2.24]-1) lower when the dummy variable equals 1 
than otherwise. In other words, this econometric specification tends to show that EU measures on 
GMOs reduce Argentina, Canada and US exports of maize seeds on average by 89.4%. The 
percentages of the reductions in exports of Argentina, Canada and the US to the EU due to the 
European moratorium and/or specific measures on GMOs are respectively 71.1% (exp[-1.24]-1) for 
maize other than seeds, 99.4% (exp[-5.17]-1) for oilseed rape, 98.3% (exp[-4.10]-1) for cotton seeds, 
70.5% (exp[-1.22]-1) for starch residues and 47.3% (exp[-0.64]-1) for preparations used in animal 
feed.  
Regarding national bans, it appears that only the Austrian ones on maize (seeds and other) and the 
Italian one on maize seeds do not have a significant impact. All other national safeguard measures 
affect Argentinean, Canadian and US exports. The impact of the German and Greek measures is 
particularly high. Exports from Argentina, Canada and the US to Germany are reduced by 97.2% 
(exp[-3.56]-1) for maize seeds and by 97.1% (exp[-3.05]-1) for maize other than seeds. Furthermore, 
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oilseed rape exports from the three complainant countries to Greece are reduced by 95.3% (exp[-3.53]-
1). 
 
 4.2 Estimations by complaining country 
So far, we have tentatively estimated the average impact of regulatory measures on GMOs on the three 
complainant‟s exports. One extension of our analysis consists in distinguishing the influence of the EU 
moratorium and/or product-specific measures on each exporting country and product. To do so, we 
divide the “EU moratorium and/or specific measures” dummy into three different dummies (one for 
Argentina, one for Canada and one for the US).
18
 Column (2) of Table 3 describes the results. 
Argentine exports of maize seeds and corn gluten are not affected by any European product-specific 
measures. Furthermore, Argentina does not produce GM oilseed rape and Canada does not produce 
GM cotton. Therefore, no coefficients are estimated for these country/product combinations. 
Estimated coefficients on all other country/product combinations, except the ones on maize other than 
seeds for Argentina and on preparations used in animal feeding for the US, are negative and significant 
at the 1% level. Strong variations in terms of magnitude are however observable for each product. For 
example, the estimated coefficient on Canadian exports of maize seeds is equal to -3.94 (export 
decrease of 98.1%), while that on US exports equals -2.14 (export reduction of 88.2%). The difference 
is even bigger for starch residues: the Canadian exports to the EU are reduced by 99.8% (exp[-6.10]-
1), while the US ones are reduced by only 67% (exp[-1.11]-1).  
 
 4.3 Discussion of the results 
Our exercise aims to address the impact of the condemned measures on complainant countries. 
Accordingly, three issues must be discussed before computing the revenue lost from the EU market by 
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 Each dummy is set to one if the dummy “EU moratorium and/or specific measures” is equal to one and the 
exporting country is respectively Argentina, Canada and the US. Here, we focus only on “EU moratorium and/or 
specific measures”. The highest revenue losses are indeed due to these measures. This division could also be 
made for all other measures adopted by the importing countries against GM products but would be less relevant. 
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complaining countries, along the restrictive lines of the WTO interpretation of the case: i) whether the 
estimated impact captures the combined impact of the GMO rejection by consumers and condemned 
measures, or the additional impact of these measures; ii) whether GMO exporters that did not join the 
panel have also been affected by these measures; and iii) whether complainants‟ exports have also 
been affected by measures taken by importers who were not condemned. 
Regarding the first question, one may argue that European measures against GM products were 
put in place following consumers‟ rejection of GMOs. But the further degradation of EU consumers‟ 
opinions regarding GMOs might in this case be self-reinforcing: negative opinion justifies measures 
that reinforce the adverse sentiment of consumers. Under such circumstances, our econometric 
strategy would hardly fully disentangle the trade effect of European measures on GMOs from the 
potential impact of rejection by consumers. However, according to the decision of the WTO panel, 
what have been breached are the SPS rules. These rules do not state that the preferences of consumers 
justify regulatory measures affecting trade. On the contrary, what these rules do state is that scientific 
evidence must be provided in support of any trade-impeding decision that is taken. 
 
A second question is whether other GM producers, which did not challenge EU measures at 
the WTO, were also affected by these measures. Brazil constitutes the best example for such an 
investigation. Monsanto‟s „Roundup Ready‟ soybean and Bollgard cotton were approved in Brazil in 
2004 and 2005, respectively. As we already mentioned, RR soybean was not affected by EU measures. 
We therefore focus on cotton and examine whether Brazil‟s exports to the EU in 2005 were affected 
by EU measures. To do so, we add Brazil to the group of countries producing GM cotton and subject 
to EU moratorium and/or specific measures.  
 
One last question is whether complainants have been affected by the restrictions on the 
authorization of GM products taken by countries outside the EU but nevertheless not concerned by the 
case. Since November 2005, Switzerland has a 5-year moratorium on the cultivation of GM crops and 
the import of genetically modified animals. The moratorium does not apply to research into GMOs nor 
does it stop imports of genetically modified food. Only imports of seeds are affected. Besides, US 
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exports of maize and soybeans seem to have been affected by the time lag between the US and Swiss 
approvals. In 1996, New Zealand put in place a general moratorium, which expired in October 2003. 
Officially, Norway has never adopted bans or moratoria on GM imports. However, few GM products 
can be imported into Norway. Imports of GM soybeans (HS 120100) and GM Maize (HS 100590) 
have not been approved. For comparison purposes, we also investigate the impact of such restrictions. 
 
Column (3) of Table 3 presents the results. The coefficient estimated on Brazil‟s exports is 
negative, significant at the 1% level, and higher than those on Argentinean and US exports. Therefore, 
we can conclude that Brazilian cotton exports are also reduced by EU restrictions, although Brazil did 
not launch a WTO case against the EU. The reduction equals 99.5% (exp[-5.37]-1). Interestingly, our 
results also show that estimated coefficients on New Zealand‟s moratorium on maize (seeds), oilseed 
rape and soybeans and Norway‟s non-approval for maize other than seeds are also negative and 
significant. Thus, exports of maize, oilseed rape and soybeans from Argentina, Canada and the US to 
New Zealand and Norway are also affected by the measures on GMOs put in place in these two 
importing countries. The percentages of the decreases are respectively 66% (exp[-1.08]-1) for maize 
seed exports to New Zealand, 99.3% (exp[-4.93]-1) for oilseed rape exports to New Zealand, 94.7% 
(exp[-2.93]-1) for soybean exports to New Zealand and 83.8% (exp[-1.82]-1) for maize other than 
seed exports to Norway. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
 4.4 Estimates of monetary revenue losses 
Notwithstanding the fact that not all affected countries have joined the case against the EU, revenue 
losses taken into account in the WTO arbitrage will be limited to the complaining countries Argentina, 
Canada and the US. The impact of EU measures on GMOs on the exports of these countries can be 
quantified in monetary terms by using the estimates from Table 3. When calculating the impact we do 
not take into account effects on non-complaining countries, nor effects of measures taken by non-EU 
importers on complainants‟ exports. Indeed, it could be argued that revenue losses result not only from 
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the direct effect (a reduction of trade flows of GM products subject to a moratorium or a safeguard 
measure), but also from an indirect effect (measures against GM imports could also prevent the 
development and production of new GM products). Still, what is at stake in the WTO panel is the 
direct trade effect, and this is what we are interested in. The reduction in exports can be calculated by 
product, country of export and measure at stake. Of course, we consider that exports are reduced only 
if the coefficient estimated on GM measures in column (3) of Table 3 is significant.  
The calculation is as follows:
19
 actual yearly flows are divided by the exponent of the coefficient 
estimate for the EU moratorium and/or specific measures from column (3) in Table 3. This gives us 
the amount of trade that would have taken place in the absence of the measures on GMOs. To obtain 
the revenue losses due to GM measures, we subtract actual flows from this amount. Using this 
method, we assume that the trade impact of GM measures is constant over time and that losses due to 
GM regulations do not affect prices of products that continue to be exported. Typically, we assume 
that if an exporter sets up an identity preserved export channel free of unapproved GMO events, prices 
and export costs are not affected. Results for the annual average revenues losses in the period 2003-
2005
20
 are reported in Table 4. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
The US is most affected by EU measures. The highest US revenue losses are observed for corn 
(seeds and other than seeds). Summing over all products, our estimations suggest that average annual 
US exports to the EU market between 2003 and 2005 have been US$1.97 billion lower than they 
would have been in the absence of the EU moratorium, product-specific measures and national bans. 
For Canada and Argentina, the respective figures are US$349.6 million and US$52.2 million. To grasp 
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 A similar approach is used by Hufbauer et al. (1997) to calculate the trade impact of US economic sanctions. 
20
 We estimate an annual trade reduction using the most recent statistics. As trade flows can fluctuate 
considerably from year to year, we use the average of the last available three years (2003-2005) for actual 
exports. Similar calculations can be done for the preceding years. 
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the relative magnitude of these revenue losses, they can be compared to the average exports of maize, 
oilseed rape, cotton and corn gluten by the US, Canada and Argentina between 2003 and 2005. The 
revenue lost from the EU market represents 26.4% of average US exports of maize, oilseed rape, 
cotton and corn gluten between 2003 and 2005. For Canada and Argentina the respective shares are 
28.1% and 3.7%. The small percentage for Argentina is largely explained by the fact that, since the 
beginning of the introduction of GM in agriculture, Argentina has only authorized the production of 
GMOs already approved by its main trading partners. 
In our study, we did not consider potential export reorientation, mainly because it is not 
considered by the WTO Panel in its assessment of complainants‟ losses. The case treated at the WTO 
focuses only on the impact of EU and Member States‟ measures infringing SPS rules on complainants‟ 
exports to the EU. Since we restrict our analysis of export losses to the exact perimeter of the case, the 
omission of reorientation effects does not bias our estimations. Beyond the case, it might however be 
acknowledged that such a reorientation would reduce GM exporting countries‟ losses. Smyth et al. 
(2006) show that Canada‟s oilseed rape sales and US corn sales to the EU were shifted to other 
markets. Market losses occurred only over a short period, and globalization quickly offered new 
export opportunities to GM producers. More generally, it would be extremely difficult to assess the 
impact of such argument due to the absence of precise data on this phenomenon. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to study the trade impact of EU measures on GMOs in the perspective of 
the WTO complaint of Argentina, Canada and the US. Since the WTO panel condemned first a 
general de facto moratorium on the approval of GMOs, second undue delays in the processing of 
product-specific applications, and third the inconsistency of the safeguard measures put in place by 
certain Member States, we took these three issues into account. Using the most recent advances in 
gravity equation estimation, we provided an estimation of losses in term of exports to the EU market 
by product, exporting country and measure at stake. Our findings tend to confirm the foundations of 
the dispute: revenue losses have been incurred by the complainants and these losses can be attributed 
to European (or Member State) decisions transgressing WTO rules. EU measures on GMOs reduce 
 23 
Argentina, Canada and US exports of the affected products on average, with effects varying across 
products and complainants. In total, yearly US revenue losses between 2003 and 2005 were US$1.97 
billion as compared with a counterfactual without the EU moratorium, product-specific measures and 
national bans. The respective numbers for Canada and Argentina are US$349.6 million and US$52.2 
million.  
Finally, departing from the strict framework of the WTO case, we also investigate the impact of 
non-approvals of GM products adopted by other countries, such as New Zealand, Switzerland and 
Norway, as well as the trade impact of EU measures on an exporting country that did not file a 
complaint, namely Brazil. The results provide refreshing insights into the case. We show that other 
importers than the EU have enforced trade-impeding measures on GMOs, while countries potentially 
negatively affected by European measures, such as Brazil for cotton, have not joined the WTO 
dispute. Such findings suggest that other determinants than revenue losses stricto sensu might have 
played a role in decisions as to whether to launch a case at the WTO. Ultimately, complaining 
countries must weigh up the costs and benefits of launching a panel. Two different issues must be 
considered here. Firstly, market size matters: it is worth bearing the costs of a very complex and long 
panel when the market concerned is very large, because the losses are very large too. From this point 
of view, the EU is certainly an ideal target for complainants, as opposed to Norway or New Zealand. 
Secondly, launching a panel at the WTO also sheds light on the policies pursued by the complainant. 
In the case of GMOs, this may be a very sensitive issue. Brazil could have been part of the case 
launched by Canada, the US and Argentina. However, it would have been an official recognition of the 
fact that Brazil was actually permanently growing GMOs, despite the temporary nature of the 
authorizations it had granted.  
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Table 1: GMOs events concerned by undue delays in the approval 
 
 
Introduction of 
the application 
EU approval Argentina approval Canada approval US approval  
GA21 maize Dec. 1997 2005 2005  1996 
Bt11 maize April 1999    1996 
NK603 maize Aug. 2000 2004 2004  2000 
Bt1507 maize Feb. 2003 2005   2001 
MS1/Rf1 oilseed rape June 1997 2005  1995  
MS1/Rf2 oilseed rape June 1997 2005  1995  
MS8/Rf3 oilseed rape Jan. 1997 2005  1996  1996 
Liberator oilseed rape Oct. 1998    1995 
RR oilseed rape Jan. 2003 2005  1994 1995 
Bt-531 cotton Nov. 1997 2005 1998  1995 
RR1445 cotton Nov. 1997 2005 2001  1995 
BXN cotton May 1999    1994 
Sources: Date of introduction of the application: 
www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/03/221&format=PDF&aged=1&language=FR
&guiLanguage=en. Approval by the US, Canada, Argentina, and the EU: Agbios database 
www.agbios.com/dbase.php  
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Table 2: GMOs events concerned by national safeguard measures 
 
 
Initiation date of 
the ban 
Argentina approval 
Canada  
approval 
US approval 
Austria - T25 maize May 2000 1998 1996 1995 
Austria - Bt176 maize Feb. 1997 1998  1995 
Austria - MON810 maize June 1999 1998  1996 
France - MS1/Rf1 oilseed rape Nov. 1998  1995 1996 
France – Topas oilseed rape Nov. 1998  1995 1995 
Germany – Bt176 maize April 2000 1998  1995 
Greece – Topas oilseed rape Nov. 1998  1995 1995 
Italy - Bt11 maize August 2000 2001 1996 1996 
Italy - MON810 maize August 2000 1998 1997 1996 
Italy - MON809 maize August 2000  1996 1996 
Italy - T25 Maize August 2000 1998 1996 1995 
Luxembourg - Bt176 Maize March1997 1998  1995 
Sources: Initiation dates of bans: 
www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/03/221&format=PDF&aged=1&language=FR
&guiLanguage=en. Approval by the US, Canada and Argentina: Agbios database www.agbios.com/dbase.php  
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Table 3: Influence of measures on GMOs 
 
Dependent variable Imports 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Ln distance -1.85*** (0.29) -1.85*** (0.29) -1.85*** (0.29) 
Common border 0.19 (0.50) 0.18 (0.50) 0.17 (0.50) 
Common language 0.05 (0.20) 0.03 (0.19) 0.03 (0.19) 
EU morat. and/or spec. meas. on maize seeds -2.24*** (0.56)     
      on Canada‟s exports   -3.94*** (0.68) -3.95*** (0.68) 
      on US exports   -2.14*** (0.59) -2.15*** (0.59) 
EU morat. and/or spec. meas. on maize (other) -1.24* (0.67)     
      on Argentina‟s exports   0.96 (0.63) 0.95 (0.63) 
      on Canada‟s exports   -4.68*** (0.47) -4.70*** (0.47) 
      on US exports   -3.43*** (0.39) -3.44*** (0.39) 
EU morat. and/or spec. meas. on oilseed rape -5.17*** (0.68)     
      on Canada‟s exports   -3.32*** (0.59) -3.33*** (0.59) 
      on US exports   -7.58*** (0.34) -7.59*** (0.34) 
EU morat. and/or spec. meas. on cotton seeds -4.10*** (0.75)     
      on Argentina‟s exports   -5.01*** (0.88) -5.03*** (0.88) 
      on US exports   -4.02*** (0.81) -4.03*** (0.81) 
      on Brazil‟s exports     -5.37*** (0.91) 
EU morat. and/or spec. meas. on starch 
residues -1.22*** (0.37)     
      on Canada‟s exports   -6.10*** (1.13) -6.14*** (1.12) 
      on US exports   -1.11*** (0.38) -1.14*** (0.38) 
EU morat. and/or spec. meas. on preparations 
used in animal feeding 
-0.64* (0.37) 
    
      on Canada‟s exports   -2.32*** (0.61) -2.35*** (0.60) 
      on US exports   -0.55 (0.40) -0.56 (0.40) 
Austria‟s ban on maize seeds 0.83 (0.78) 0.85 (0.77) 0.85 (0.77) 
Austria‟s ban on maize (other) -0.88 (0.75) -1.02 (1.04) -1.02 (1.04) 
Germany‟s ban on maize seeds -3.56*** (0.69) -3.55*** (0.67) -3.56*** (0.67) 
Germany‟s ban on maize (other) -3.05*** (0.65) -3.29*** (1.14) -3.29*** (1.14) 
Italy‟s ban on maize seeds -0.87 (0.94) -0.81 (0.91) -0.82 (0.91) 
Italy‟s ban on maize (other) -1.94** (0.91) -2.30*** (0.62) -2.30*** (0.63) 
France‟s ban on oilseed rape -1.82*** (0.67) -1.61 (1.10) -1.61 (1.10) 
Greece‟s ban on oilseed rape -3.53** (1.50) -3.27*** (0.57) -3.27*** (0.57) 
New Zealand‟s morat. on maize seeds     -1.08* (0.58) 
New Zealand‟s morat. on maize (other)     -0.39 (0.59) 
New Zealand‟s morat. on oilseed rape     -4.93*** (0.56) 
New Zealand‟s morat. on soybeans     -2.93*** (1.02) 
Switzerland‟s morat. on maize (other)     -0.87 (0.61) 
Switzerland‟s morat. on soybeans     1.03 (0.40) 
Norway‟s non-approv. on maize (other)     -1.82** (0.92) 
Norway‟s non-approv. on soybeans     -0.18 (0.72) 
Observations & reset test p-values 57,552 & 0.360 57,552 & 0.374 57,552 & 0.374 
Note: 480 importer x year and 240 exporter x year fixed effects in all estimations (not reported). Std. errors 
(importer-exporter clustered) in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, 
respectively.  
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Table 4: Average annual export revenue losses due to European measures on GMOs 2003-2005 
(thousand US dollars) 
 
 Argentina Canada United States 
 HS 100510 - Maize (seeds) 
EU moratorium and/or specific measures  68,441.9 471,603.0 
Germany‟s safeguard measure 2,531.5 2,329.9 29,209.5 
 HS 100590 - Maize (other) 
EU moratorium and/or specific measures  103,031.3 379,652.3 
Germany‟s safeguard measure 5,641.5 948.4 22,059.5 
Italy‟s safeguard measure 8,360.3 175.0 5,718.3 
 HS 120500 - Oilseed rape (seeds and other) 
EU moratorium and/or specific measures  34,769.3 266,937.3 
Greece‟s safeguard measure 0 111.4 0 
 HS 120720 – Cotton seeds 
EU moratorium and/or specific measures 35,628.3  381,626.3 
 HS 230310 – Starch residues 
EU moratorium and/or specific measures  64,457.1 411,595.9 
 HS 230990 – Preparations used in animal feeding 
EU moratorium and/or specific measures  75,383.7  
Note: Calculated as [(actual yearly imports)/exp(coefficient on EU morat. and/or spec. meas. from column (3) of 
Table 3)]- actual yearly imports.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
